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Abstract. We provide a formal, simple and intuitive theory of rational
decision making including sequential decisions that affect the environ-
ment. The theory has a geometric flavor, which makes the arguments
easy to visualize and understand. Our theory is for complete decision
makers, which means that they have a complete set of preferences. Our
main result shows that a complete rational decision maker implicitly has
a probabilistic model of the environment. We have a countable version of
this result that brings light on the issue of countable vs finite additivity
by showing how it depends on the geometry of the space which we have
preferences over. This is achieved through fruitfully connecting rational-
ity with the Hahn-Banach Theorem. The theory presented here can be
viewed as a formalization and extension of the betting odds approach to
probability of Ramsey and De Finetti [Ram31, deF37].
Keywords: Rationality, Probability, Utility, Banach Space, Linear
Functional.
1 Introduction
We study complete decision makers that can take a sequence of actions to ratio-
nally pursue any given task. We suppose that the task is described in a reinforce-
ment learning framework where the agent takes actions and receives observations
and rewards. The aim is to maximize total reward in some given sense.
Rationality is meant in the sense of internal consistency [Sug91], which is how
it has been used in [NM44] and [Sav54]. In [NM44], it is proven that preferences
together with rationality axioms and probabilities for possible events imply the
existence of utility values for those events that explain the preferences as arising
through maximizing expected utility. Their rationality axioms are
1. Completeness: Given any two choices we either prefer one of them to the
other or we consider them to be equally preferable;
2. Transitivity: A preferable to B and B to C imply A preferable to C;
3. Independence: If A is preferable to B and t ∈ [0, 1] then tA + (1 − t)C is
preferable (or equal) to tB + (1 − t)C;
4. Continuity: If A is preferable to B and B to C then there exists t ∈ [0, 1]
such that B is equally preferable to tA + (1 − t)C.
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In [Sav54] the probabilities are not given but it is instead proven that preferences
together with rationality axioms imply the existence of probabilities and utilities.
We are here interested in the case where one is given utility (rewards) and
preferences over actions and then deriving the existence of a probabilistic world
model. We put an emphasis on extensions to sequential decision making with
respect to a countable class of environments. We set up simple axioms for a
rational decision maker, which implies that the decisions can be explained (or
defined) from probabilistic beliefs.
The theory of [Sav54] is called subjective expected utility theory (SEUT)
and was intended to provide statistics with a strictly behaviorial foundation.
The behavioral approach stands in stark contrast to approaches that directly
postulate axioms that “degrees of belief” should satisfy [Cox46, Hal99, Jay03].
Cox’s approach [Cox46, Jay03] has also been found [Par94] to need additional
technical assumptions in addition to the common sense axioms originally listed
by Cox. The original proof by [Cox46] has been exposed as not mathematically
rigorous and his theorem as wrong [Hal99]. An alternative approach by [Ram31,
deF37] is interpreting probabilities as fair betting odds.
The theory of [Sav54] has greatly influenced economics [Sug91] where it has
been used as a description of rational agents. Seemingly strange behavior was
explained as having beliefs (probabilities) and tastes (utilities) that were different
from those of the person to whom it looked irrational. This has turned out
to be insufficient as a description of human behavior [All53, Ell61] and it is
better suited as a normative theory or design principle in artificial intelligence.
In this article, we are interested in studying the necessity for rational agents
(biological or not) to have a probabilistic model of their environment. To achieve
this, and to have as simple common sense axioms of rationality as possible, we
postulate that given any set of values (a contract) associated with the possible
events, the decision maker needs to have an opinion on wether he prefers these
values to a guaranteed zero outcome or not (or equal). From this setting and our
other rationality axioms we deduce the existence of probabilities that explain
all preferences as maximizing expected value. There is an intuitive similarity
to the idea of explaining/deriving probabilities as a bookmaker’s betting odds
as done in [deF37] and [Ram31]. One can argue that the theory presented here
(in Section 2) is a formalization and extension of the betting odds approach.
Geometrically, the result says that there is a hyper-plane in the space of contracts
that separates accept from reject. We generalize this statement, by using the
Hahn-Banach Theorem, to the countable case where the set of hyper-planes
(the dual space) depends on the space of contract. The answers for different
cases can then be found in the Banach space theory literature. This provides
a new approach to understanding issues like finite vs. countable additivity. We
take advantage of this to formulate rational agents that can deal successfully
with countable (possibly universal as in all computable environments) classes of
environments.
Our presentation begins in Section 2 by first looking at a fundamental case
where one has to accept or reject certain contracts defining positive and negative
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rewards that depend on the outcome of an event with finitely many possibilities.
To draw the conclusion that there are implicit unique probabilistic beliefs, it
is important that the decision maker has an opinion (acceptable, rejectable or
both) on every possible contract. This is what we mean when we say complete
decision maker.
In a more general setting, we consider sequential decision making where given
any contract on the sequence of observations and actions, the decision maker
must be able to choose a policy (i.e. an action tree). Note that the actions may
affect the environment. A contract on such a sequence can e.g. be viewed as
describing a reward structure for a task. An example of a task is a cleaning
robot that gets positive rewards for collecting dust and negative for falling down
the stairs. A prerequisite for being able to continue to collect dust can be to
recharge the battery before running out. A specialized decision maker that deals
only with one contract/task does not always need to have implicit probabilities,
it can suffice with qualitative beliefs to take reasonable decisions. A qualitative
belief can be that one pizza delivery company (e.g. Pizza Hut vs Dominos) is
more likely to arrive on time than the other. If one believes the pizzas are equally
good and the price is the same, we will chose the company we believe is more
often delivering on time. Considering all contracts (reward structures) on the
actions and events, leads to a situation where having a way of making rational
(coherent) decisions, implies that the decision maker has implicit probabilistic
beliefs. We say that the probabilities are implicit because the decision maker,
which might e.g. be a human, a dog, a computer or just a set of rules, might
have a non-probabilistic description of how the decisions are made.
In Section 3, we investigate extensions to the case with countably many pos-
sible outcomes and the interesting issue of countable versus finite additivity.
Savage’s axioms are known to only lead to finite additivity while [Arr70] showed
that adding a monotone continuity assumption guarantees countable additivity.
We find that in our setting, it depends on the space of contracts in an interesting
way. In Section 4, we discuss a setting where we have a class of environments.
2 Rational Decisions for Accepting or Rejecting
Contracts
We consider a setting where we observe a symbol (letter) from a finite alphabet
and we are offered a form of bet we call a contract that we can accept or not.
Definition 1 (Passive Environment, Event). A passive environment is a
sequence of symbols (letters) jt, called events, being presented one at a time. At
time t the symbols j1, ..., jt are available. We can equivalently say that a passive
environment is a function ν from finite strings to {0, 1} where ν(j1, ..., jt) = 1
if and only if the environment begins with j1, ..., jt.
Definition 2 (Contract). Suppose that we have a passive environment with
symbols from an alphabet with m elements. A contract for an event is an element
x = (x1, ..., xm) in Rm and xj is the reward received if the event is the j:th
symbol, under the assumption that the contract is accepted (see next definition).
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Definition 3 (Decision Maker, Decision). A decision maker (for some un-
known environment) is a set Z ⊂ Rm which defines exactly the contracts that are
acceptable. In other words, a decision maker is a function from Rm to {accepted,
rejected, either}. The function value is called the decision.
If x ∈ Z and λ ≥ 0 then we want λx ∈ Z since it is simply a multiple of
the same contract. We also want the sum of two acceptable contracts to be
acceptable. If we cannot lose money we are prepared to accept the contract. If
we are guaranteed to win money we are not prepared to reject it. We summarize
these properties in the definition below of a rational decision maker.
Definition 4 (Rationality I). We say that the decision maker (Z ⊂ Rm) is
rational if
1. Every contract x ∈ Rm is either acceptable or rejectable or both;
2. x is acceptable if and only if −x is rejectable;
3. x, y ∈ Z, λ, γ ≥ 0 then λx + γy ∈ Z;
4. If xk ≥ 0 ∀k then x = (x1, ..., xm) ∈ Z while if xk < 0 ∀k then x /∈ Z.
If we want to compare these axioms to rationality axioms for a preference relation
on contracts we will say that x is better or equal (as in equally good) than y if
x−y is acceptable while it is worse or equal if x−y is rejectable. The first axiom
is completeness. The second says that if x is better or equal than y then y is
worse or equal to x. The third implies transitivity since (x−y)+(y−z) = (x−z).
The fourth says that if x has a better (or equal) reward than y for any event,
then x is better (or equal) than y.
2.1 Probabilities and Expectations
Theorem 5 (Existence of Probabilities). Given a rational decision maker,
there are numbers pi ≥ 0 that satisfy
{x |
∑
xipi > 0} ⊂ Z ⊆ {x |
∑
xipi ≥ 0}. (1)
Assuming
∑
i pi = 1 makes the numbers unique and we will use the notation
Pr(i) = pi.
Proof. See the proof of the more general Theorem 23. It tells us that the closure
Z̄ of Z is a closed half space and can be written as {x | ∑ xipi ≥ 0} for some
vector p = (pi) (since every linear functional on Rm is of the form f(x) =
∑
xipi)
and not every pi is 0. The fourth property tells us that pi ≥ 0 ∀i.
Definition 6 (Expectation). We will refer to the function g(x) =
∑
pixi from
(1) as the decision makers expectation. In this terminology, a rational decision
maker has an expectation function and accepts a contract x if g(x) > 0 and reject
it if g(x) < 0.
Remark 7. Suppose that we have a contract x = (xi) where xi = 1 for all i. If
we want g(x) = 1, we need
∑
pi = 1.
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We will write E(x) instead of g(x) (assuming
∑
pi = 1) from now on and call it
the expected value or expectation of x.
2.2 Multiple Events
Suppose that the contract is such that we can view the symbol to be drawn as
consisting of two (or several) symbols from smaller alphabets. That is we can
write a drawn symbol as (i, j) where all the possibilities can be found through
1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. In this way of writing, a contract is defined by real
numbers xi,j . Theorem 5 tells us that for a rational decision maker there exists
unique ri,j ≥ 0 such that
∑
i,j ri,j = 1 and an expectation function g(x) =∑
ri,jxi,j such that contracts are accepted if g(x) > 0 and rejected if g(x) < 0.
2.3 Marginals
Suppose that we can take rational decisions on bets for a pair of horse races,
while the person that offers us bets only cares about the first race. Then we are
still equipped to respond since the bets that only depend on the first race is a
subset of all bets on the pair of races.
Definition 8 (Marginals). Suppose that we have a rational decision maker
(Z) for contracts on the events (i, j). Then we say that the marginal decision
maker for the first symbol (Z1) is the restriction of the decision maker Z to
the contracts xi,j that only depend on i, i.e. xi,j = xi. In other words given a
contract y = (yi) on the first event, we extend that contract to a contract on
(i, j) by letting yi,j = yi and then the original decision maker can decide.
Suppose that xi,j = xi. Then the expectation
∑
ri,jxi,j can be rewritten as∑
pixi where pi =
∑
j ri,j . We write that
Pr(i) =
∑
j
Pr(i, j).
These are the marginal probabilities for the first variable that describe the
marginal decision maker for that variable. Naturally we can also define a marginal
for the second variable (considering contracts xi,j = xj) by letting qj =
∑
i ri,j
and Pr(j) =
∑
i Pr(i, j). The marginals define sets Z1 ⊂ Rm and Z2 ⊂ Rn of
acceptable contracts on the first and second variables separately.
2.4 Conditioning
Again suppose that we are taking decisions on bets for a pair of horse races, but
this time suppose that the first race is already over and we know the result. We
are still equipped to respond to bets on the second race by extending the bet to
a bet on both where there is no reward for (pairs of) events that are inconsistent
with what we know.
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Definition 9 (Conditioning). Suppose that we have a rational decision maker
(Z) for contracts on the events (i, j). We define the conditional decision maker
Zj=j0 for i given j = j0 by restricting the original decision maker Z to contracts
xi,j which are such that xi,j = 0 if j = j0. In other words if we start with a
contract y = (yi) on i we extend it to a contract on (i, j) by letting yi,j0 = yi
and yi,j = 0 if j = j0. Then the original decision maker can make a decision for
that contract.
Suppose that xi,j = 0 if j = j0. The unconditional expectation of this contract is∑
i,j ri,jxi,j as usual which equals
∑
i ri,j0xi,j0 . This leads to the same decisions
(i.e. the same Z) as using
∑
i
ri,j0∑
k rk,j0
xi,j0 which is of the form in Theorem 5.
We write that
Pr(i|j0) = Pr(i, j0)∑
k Pr(k, j0)
=
Pr(i, j0)
Pr(j0)
. (2)
From this it follows that
Pr(i0)Pr(j0|i0) = Pr(j0)Pr(i0|j0) (3)
which is one way of writing Bayes rule.
2.5 Learning
In the previous section we defined conditioning which lead us to a definition
of what it means to learn. Given that we have probabilities for events that are
sequences of a certain number of symbols and we have observed one or several of
them, we use conditioning to determine what our belief regarding the remaining
symbols should be.
Definition 10 (Learning). Given a rational decision maker, defined by pi1,...,iT
for the events (it)Tt=1 and the first t − 1 symbols i1, ..., it−1, we define the in-
formed rational decision maker for it by conditioning on the past i1, ..., it−1 and
marginalize over the future it+1, ..., iT . Formally,
P informedit (i) = Pr(i|i1, ..., it) =
∑
jt+1,...,jT
pi1,...,it,jt+1,...,jT∑
jt,...,jT
pi1,...,it−1,jt,...,jT
.
2.6 Choosing between Contracts
Definition 11 (Choosing contract). We say that to rationally prefer contract
x over y is (equivalent) to rationally consider x − y to be acceptable.
As before we assume that we have a decision maker that takes rational decisions
on accepting or rejecting contracts x that are based on an event that will be
observed. Hence there exist implicit probabilities that represent all choices and
an expectation function. Suppose that an agent has to choose between action a1
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that leads to receiving reward xi if i is drawn and action a2 that leads to receiving
yi in the case of seeing i. Let zi = xi−yi. We can now go back to choosing between
accepting and rejecting a contract by saying that choosing (preferring) a1 over
a2 means accepting the contract z. In other words if E(x) > E(y) choose a1 and
if E(x) < E(y) choose a2.
Remark 12. We note that if we postulate that choosing between contract x and
the zero contract is the same as choosing between accepting or rejecting x, then
being able to choose between contracts implies the ability to choose between
accepting and rejecting one contract. We, therefore, can say that the ability to
choose between a pair of contracts is equivalent to the ability to choose to accept
or reject a single contract.
We can also choose between several contracts. Suppose that action ak gives us
the contract xk = (xki )
m
i=1. If E(x
j) > E(xk) ∀k = j then we strictly prefer
aj over all other actions. In other words a contract xj − xk would for all k be
accepted and not rejected by a rational decision maker.
Remark 13. If we have a rational decision maker for accepting or rejecting con-
tracts, then there are implicitly probabilities pi for symbol i that characterize
the decisions. A rational choice between actions ak leading to contracts xk is
taken by choosing action
a∗ = argmax
k
∑
i
pix
k
i . (4)
2.7 Choosing between Environments
In this section, we assume that the event that the contracts are concerned with
might be affected by the choice of action.
Definition 14 (Reactive environment). An environment is a tree with sym-
bols jt (percepts) on the nodes and actions at on the edges. We provide the
environment with an action at at each time t and it presents the symbol jt at the
node we arrive at by following the edge chosen by the action. We can also equiv-
alently say that a reactive environment ν is a function from strings a1j1, ..., atjt
to {0, 1} which equals 1 if and only if ν would produce j1, ..., jt given the actions
a1, ..., at.
We will define the concept of a decision maker for the case where one decision
will be taken in a situation where not only the contract, but also the outcome
can depend on the choice. We do this by defining the choice as being between
two different environments.
Definition 15 (Active decision maker). Consider a choice between having
contract x for passive environment env1 or contract y for passive environment
env2. A decision maker is a set Z ⊂ Rm1 × Rm2 which defines exactly the pairs
(x, y) for which we choose env1 with x over env2 with y.
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Definition 16 (Rational active choice). To choose between action a1 with
contract x and a2 with contract y in a situation where the action may affect
the event, we consider two separate environments, namely the environments that
result from the two different actions. We would then have a situation where we
will have one observation from each environment. Preferring a1 with x to a2
with y is (equivalent) to consider x − y to be an acceptable contract for the pair
of events.
Remark 17. Definition 16 means that a1 with x is preferred over a2 with y if a1
with x − y is preferred over a2 with the zero contract.
Proposition 18 (Probabilities for reactive setting). Suppose that we have
a reactive environment and a rational active decision maker that will make one
choice between action a1 and a2 as described in Definitions 15 and 16, then there
exist pi ≥ 0 and qi ≥ 0 such that action a1 with contract x is preferred over
action a2 with contract y if
∑
pixi >
∑
qiyi and the reverse if
∑
pixi <
∑
qiyi.
This means that the decision maker acts according to probabilities Pr(·|a1) and
Pr(·|a2).
Proof. Let Z̃ be all contracts that when combined with action a1 is preferred
over a2 with the zero contract. Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of pi such
that
∑
pixi > 0 implies that x ∈ Z̃ and
∑
pixi < 0 implies that x /∈ Z̃. The
same way we find qi that describe when we prefer a2 with y to a1 with the zero
contract. That these probabilities (pi and qi) explain the full decision maker as
stated in the proposition now follows directly from Definition 16 understood as
in Remark 17.
Suppose that we are going to make a sequence of T < ∞ decisions where at
every point of time we will have a finite number of actions to chose between. We
will consider contracts, which can pay out some reward at each time step and
that can depend on everything (actions chosen and symbols observed) that has
happened up until this time and we want to maximize the accumulated reward
at time T .
We can view the choice as just making one choice, namely choosing an action
tree. We will sometimes call an action tree a policy.
Definition 19 (Action tree). An action tree is a function from histories of
symbols j1, ..., jt and decisions a1, ..., at−1 to new decisions, given that the deci-
sions were made according to the function. Formally,
f(a1, j1, ..., at−1, jt−1) = at.
An action tree will assign exactly one action for any of the circumstances that
one can end up in. That is, given the history up to any time t < T of actions
and events, we have a chosen action. We can, therefore, choose an action tree at
time 0 and receive a total accumulated reward at time T . This brings us back
to the situation of one event and one rational choice.
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Definition 20 (Sequential decisions). Given a rational decision maker for
the events (jt)Tt=1 and the first t−1 symbols j1, ..., jt−1 and decisions a1, ..., at−1,
we define the informed rational decision maker at time t by conditioning on the
past a1, j1..., at−1, jt−1.
Proposition 21 (Beliefs for sequential decisions). Suppose that we have
a reactive environment and a rational decision maker that will take T < ∞
decisions. Furthermore, suppose that the decisions 0 ≤ t < T have been taken and
resulted in history a1, j1..., at−1, jt−1. Then the decision makers preferences at
this time can be explained (through expected utility maximization) by probabilities
Pr(jt, ..., jT |a1, j1..., at−1, jt−1, at, at+1..., aT ).
Proof. Definition 20 and Proposition 18 immediately lead us to the conclusion
that given a past up to a point t − 1 and a policy for the time t to T we have
probabilistic beliefs over the possible future sequences from time t to T and the
choice is categorized by maximizing expected accumulated reward at time T .
3 Countable Sets of Events
Instead of a finite set of possible outcomes, we will in this section assume a
countable set. We suppose that the set of contracts is a vector space of sequences
xk, k = 0, 1, 2, ... where we use pointwise addition and multiplication with scalar.
We will define a space by choosing a norm and let the space consist of the
sequences that have finite norm as is common in Banach space theory. If the
norm makes the space complete it is called a Banach sequence space [Die84].
Interesting examples are ∞ of bounded sequences with the maximum norm
‖(αk)‖∞ = max |αk|, c0 of sequence that converges to 0 equipped with the same
maximum norm and p which for 1 ≤ p < ∞ is defined by the norm
‖(αk)‖p = (
∑
|αk|p)1/p.
For all of these spaces we can consider weighted versions (wk > 0) where
‖(αk)‖p,wk = ‖(αkwk)‖p.
This means that α ∈ p(w) iff (αkwk) ∈ p, e.g. α ∈ ∞(w) iff supk |αkwk| < ∞.
Given a Banach (sequence) space X we use X ′ to denote the dual space that
consists of all continuous linear functionals f : X → R. It is well known that a
linear functional on a Banach space is continuous if and only if it is bounded, i.e.
that there is C < ∞ such that |f(x)|‖x‖ ≤ C ∀x ∈ X . Equipping X ′ with the norm
‖f‖ = sup |f(x)|‖x‖ makes it into a Banach space. Some examples are (1)′ = ∞,
c′0 = 1 and for 1 < p < ∞ we have that (p)′ = q where 1/p + 1/q = 1. These
identifications are all based on formulas of the form
f(x) =
∑
xipi
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where the dual space is the space that (pi) must lie in to make the functional
both well defined and bounded. It is clear that 1 ⊂ (∞)′ but (∞)′ also contains
“stranger” objects.
The existence of these other objects can be deduced from the Hahn-Banach
theorem (see e.g. [Kre89] or [NB97]) that says that if we have a linear function
defined on a subspace Y ∈ X and if it is bounded on Y then there is an ex-
tension to a bounded linear functional on X . If Y is dense in X the extension
is unique but in general it is not. One can use this Theorem by first looking at
the subspace of all sequences in ∞ that converge and let f(α) = limk→∞ αk.
The Hahn-Banach theorem guarantees the existence of extensions to bounded
linear functionals that are defined on all of ∞. These are called Banach lim-
its. The space (∞)′ can be identified with the so called ba space of bounded
and finitely additive measures with the variation norm ‖ν‖ = |ν|(A) where A
is the underlying set. Note that 1 can be identified with the smaller space of
countably additive bounded measures with the same norm. The Hahn-Banach
Theorem has several equivalent forms. One of these identifies the hyper-planes
with the bounded linear functionals [NB97].
Definition 22 (Rationality II). Given a Banach sequence space X of con-
tracts, we say that the decision maker (subset Z of X defining acceptable con-
tracts) is rational if
1. Every contract x ∈ X is either acceptable or rejectable or both;
2. x is acceptable if and only if −x is rejectable;
3. x, y ∈ Z, λ, γ ≥ 0 then λx + γy ∈ Z;
4. If xk ≥ 0 ∀k then x = (xk) is acceptable while if xk > 0 ∀k then x is not
rejectable.
Theorem 23 (Linear separation). Suppose that we have a space of contracts
X that is a Banach sequence space. Given a rational decision maker there is a
positive continuous linear functional f : X → R such that
{x | f(x) > 0} ⊂ Z ⊆ {x | f(x) ≥ 0}. (5)
Proof. The third property tells us that Z and −Z are convex cones. The second
and fourth property tells us that Z = Rm. Suppose that there is a point x that
lies in both the interior of Z and of −Z. Then the same is true for −x according
to the second property and for the origin. That a ball around the origin lies
in Z means that Z = Rm which is not true. Thus the interiors of Z and −Z
are disjoint open convex sets and can, therefore, be separated by a hyperplane
(according to the Hahn-Banach theorem) which goes through the origin (since
according to the second and fourth property the origin is both acceptable and
rejectable). The first two properties tell us that Z∪−Z = Rm. Given a separating
hyperplane (between the interiors of Z and −Z), Z must contain everything on
one side. This means that Z is a half space whose boundary is a hyperplane that
goes through the origin and the closure Z̄ of Z is a closed half space and can be
written as {x | f(x) ≥ 0} for some f ∈ X ′. The fourth property tells us that f
is positive.
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Corollary 24 (Additivity). 1. If X = c0 then a rational decision maker is
described by a countably additive (probability) measure.
2. If X = ∞ then a rational decision maker is described by a finitely additive
(probability) measure.
It seems from Corollary 24 that we pay the price of losing countable additivity
for expanding the space of contracts from c0 to ∞ but we can expand the
space even more by looking at c0(w) where wk → 0 which contains ∞ and X ′
is then 1((1/wk)). This means that we get countable additivity back but we
instead have a restriction on how fast the probabilities pk must tend to 0. Note
that a bounded linear functional on c0 can always be extended to a bounded
linear functional on ∞ by the formula f(x) =
∑
pixi but that is not the unique
extension. Note also that every bounded linear functional on ∞ can be restricted
to c0 and there be represented as f(x) =
∑
pixi. Therefore, a rational decision
maker on ∞ contracts has probabilistic beliefs (unless pi = 0 ∀i), though it might
also take asymptotic behavior of a contract into account. For example (and here
pi = 0 ∀i), the decision maker that makes decisions based on asymptotic averages
limn→∞ 1n
∑n
i=1 xi when they exist. That strategy can be extended to all of 
∞
(a Banach limit). The following proposition will help us decide which decision
maker on ∞ is described with countably additive probabilities.
Proposition 25. Suppose that f ∈ (∞)′. For any x ∈ ∞, let xji = xi if i ≤ j
and xji = 0 otherwise. If for any x,
lim
j→∞
f(xj) = f(x),
then f can be written as f(x) =
∑
pixi where pi ≥ 0 and
∑∞
i=1 pi < ∞.
Proof. The restriction of f to c0 gives us numbers pi ≥ 0 such that
∑∞
i=1 pi < ∞
and f(x) =
∑
pixi for x ∈ c0. This means that f(xj) =
∑j
i=1 pixi for any x ∈ ∞
and j < ∞. Thus limj→∞ f(xj) =
∑∞
i=1 pixi.
Definition 26 (Monotone decisions). We define the concept of a monotone
decision maker in the following way. Suppose that for every x ∈ ∞ there is
N < ∞ such that the decision is the same for all xj , j ≥ N (See Proposition 25
for definition) as for x. Then we say that the decision maker is monotone.
Example 27. Let f ∈ ∞ be such that if limαk → L then f(α) = L (i.e. f is
a Banach limit). Furthermore define a rational decision maker by letting the
set of acceptable contracts be Z = {x | f(x) ≥ 0}. Then f(xj) = 0 (where we
use notation from Proposition 25) for all j < ∞ and regardless of which x we
define xj from. Therefore, all sequences that are eventually zero are acceptable
contracts. This means that this decision maker is not monotone since there are
contracts that are not acceptable.
Theorem 28 (Monotone rationality). Given a monotone rational decision
maker for ∞ contracts, there are pi ≥ 0 such that
∑
pi < ∞ and
{x |
∑
xipi > 0} ⊂ Z ⊆ {x |
∑
xipi ≥ 0}. (6)
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Proof. According to Theorem 23 there is f ∈ (∞)′ such that (the closure of
Z) Z̄ = {x| f(x) ≥ 0} . Let pi ≥ 0 be such that
∑
pi < ∞ and such that
f(x) =
∑
xipi for x ∈ c0. Remember that xj (notation as in Proposition 25) is
always in c0. Suppose that there is x such that x is accepted but
∑
xipi < 0.
This violate monotonicity since there exist N < ∞ such that ∑ni=1 xipi < 0
for all n ≥ N and, therefore, xj is not accepted for j ≥ N but x is accepted.
We conclude that if x is accepted then
∑
pixi ≥ 0 and if
∑
pixi > 0 then x is
accepted.
4 Rational Agents for Classes of Environments
We will here study agents that are designed to deal with a large range of situa-
tions. Given a class of environments we want to define agents that can learn to
act well when placed in any of them, assuming it is at all possible.
Definition 29 (Universality for a class). We say that a decision maker is
universal for a class of environments M if for any outcome sequence a1j1a2j2...
that given the actions would be produced by some environment in the class, there
is c > 0 (depending on the sequence) such that the decision maker has probabil-
ities that satisfy
Pr(j1, ..., jt|a1, ..., at) ≥ c ∀t.
This is obviously true if the decision maker’s probabilistic beliefs are a convex
combination
∑
ν∈M wνν, wν > 0 and
∑
ν wν = 1.
We will next discuss how to define some large classes of environments and agents
that can succeed for them. We assume that the total accumulated reward from
the environment will be finite regardless of our actions since we want any policy
to have finite utility. Furthermore, we assume that rewards are positive and that
it is possible to achieve strictly positive rewards in any environment. We would
like the agent to perform well regardless of which environment from the chosen
class it is placed in.
For any possible policy (action tree) π and environment ν, there is a total
reward V πν that following π in ν would result in. This means that for any π
there is a contract sequence (V πν )ν , assuming we have enumerated our set of
environments. Let
V ∗ν = maxπ V
π
ν .
We know that V ∗ν > 0 for all ν. Every contract sequence (V
π
ν )ν lies in X =
∞((1/V ∗ν )) and ‖(V πν )‖X ≤ 1. The rational decision makers are the positive,
continuous linear functionals on X . X ′ contains the space 1(V ∗ν ). In other words
if wν ≥ 0 and
∑
wνV
∗
ν < ∞ then the sequence (wν) defines a rational decision
maker for the contract space X . These are exactly the monotone rational decision
makers. Letting (which is the AIXI agent from [Hut05])
π∗ ∈ argmax
π
∑
ν
wνV
π
ν (7)
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we have a choice with the property that for any other π with
∑
ν
wνV
π
ν <
∑
ν
wνV
π∗
ν .
Hence the contract (V π
∗
ν − V πν ) is not rejectable. In other words π∗ is strictly
preferable to π. By letting pν = wνV ∗ν , we can rewrite (7) as
π∗ ∈ argmax
π
∑
ν
pν
V πν
V ∗ν
. (8)
If one further restricts the class of environments by assuming V ∗ν ≤ 1 for all ν
then for every π, (V πν ) ∈ ∞. Therefore, by Theorem 28 the monotone rational
agents for this setting can be formulated as in (7) with (wν) ∈ 1, i.e.
∑
ν wν <
∞. However, since (pν) ∈ 1, a formulation of the form of (8) is also possible.
Normalizing p and w individually to probabilities makes (7) into a maximum
expected utility criterion and (8) into maximum relative utility. As long as our
w and p relate the way they do it is still the same decisions. If we would base both
expectations on the same probabilistic beliefs it would be different criteria. When
we have an upper bound V ∗ν < b < ∞ ∀ν we can always translate expected utility
to expected relative utility in this way, while we need a lower bound 0 < a < V ∗ν
to rewrite an expected relative utility as an expected utility. Note, the different
criteria will start to deviate from each other after updating the probabilistic
beliefs.
4.1 Asymptotic Optimality
Denote a chosen countable class of environments by M. Let V πν,k be the re-
wards achieved after time k using policy π in environment ν. We suppress the
dependence on the history so far. Let
Wπν,k =
V πν,k
V ∗ν,k
denote the skill (relative reward) of π in environment ν from time k. The maxi-
mum possible skill is 1. We would like to have a policy π such that
lim
k→∞
Wπν,k = 1 ∀ν ∈ M.
This would mean that the agent asymptotically achieve maximum skill when
placed in any environment from M. Let I(hk, ν) = 1 if ν is consistent with
history hk and I(hk, ν) = 0 otherwise. Furthermore, let
pν,k =
pν,0∑
μ∈M pμ,0I(hk, μ)
be the agent’s weight for environment ν at time k and let πp be a policy that at
time k acts according to a policy in
argmax
π
∑
ν
pν,k
V πν,k
V ∗ν,k
. (9)
Axioms for Rational Reinforcement Learning 351
In the following theorem, we prove that for every environment ν ∈ M, the policy
πp will asymptotically achieve perfect relative rewards. We have to assume that
there exists a sequence of policies πk > 0 with this property (as for the similar
Theorem 5.34 in [Hut05] which dealt with discounted values). The convergence
in W -values is the relevant sense of optimality for our setting, since the V -values
converge to zero for any policy.
Theorem 30 (Asymptotic optimality). Suppose that we have a decision
maker that is universal (i.e. pν > 0 ∀ν) with respect to the countable class M of
environments (which can be stochastic) and that there exists policies πk such that
for all ν, Wπk,νk → 1 if ν is the actual environment (or the sequence is consistent
with ν). This implies that Wπ
p,μ
k → 1 where μ is the actual environment.
The proof technique is similar to that of Theorem 5.34 in [Hut05].
Proof. Let
0 ≤ 1 − Wπk,νk =: Δkν , Δk =
∑
ν
pν,kΔ
k
ν . (10)
The assumptions tells us that Δkν = W
πk,ν
k − 1 → 0 for all ν that are consistent
with the sequence (pν,k = 0 if ν is inconsistent with the history at time k) and
since Δkν ≤ 1 , it follows that
Δk =
∑
ν
pν,kΔ
k
ν → 0.
Note that pμ,k(1 − Wπ
p,μ
k ) ≤
∑
ν pν,k(1 − W νπp,k) ≤
∑
ν pν,k(1 − W kπk,ν) =∑
pν,kΔ
k
ν = Δ
k. Since we also know that pμ,k ≥ pμ,0 > 0 it follows that
(1 − Wπp,μk ) → 0.
5 Conclusions
We studied complete rational decision makers including the cases of actions
that may affect the environment and sequential decision making. We set up
simple common sense rationality axioms that imply that a complete rational
decision maker has preferences that can be characterized as maximizing expected
utility. Of particular interest is the countable case where our results follow from
identifying the Banach space dual of the space of contracts.
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